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Abstract— It is difficult to implement an efficient detection approach for Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and many factors 
contribute to this challenge. One such challenge concerns establishing adequate boundaries and finding a proper data source. Typical 
IDS detection approaches deal with raw traffics. These traffic need to be studied in depth and thoroughly investigated to extract the 
required knowledge base. Another challenge involves implementing a binary decision. This is because there are no reasonable limits 
between normal and attack traffics patterns. In this paper, we introduce a novel idea capable of supporting the proper data source 
while avoiding the issues associated with the binary decision. This paper aims to introduce a detection approach for defining 
abnormality by using the Fuzzy Rule Interpolation (FRI) with Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management 
Information Base (MIB) parameters. The strength of the proposed detection approach is based on adapting the SNMP-MIB 
parameters with the FRI.  This proposed method eliminates the raw traffic processing component, which is time-consuming and 
requires extensive computational measures. It also eliminates the need for a complete fuzzy rule-based intrusion definition. The 
proposed approach was tested and evaluated using an open source SNMP-MIB dataset and obtained a 93% detection rate. 
Additionally, when compared to other literature in which the same test-bed environment was employed along with the same number 
of parameters, the proposed detection approach outperformed the support vector machine and neural network. Therefore, combining 
the SNMP-MIB parameters with the FRI based reasoning could be beneficial for detecting intrusions, even in the case if the fuzzy 
rule-based intrusion definition is incomplete (not fully defined). 
Keywords— intrusion detection system; fuzzy rule interpolation; SNMP; management information base. 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nowadays, computers and network resources face a 
different type of attacks. Modern attacks are implemented 
ingeniously, i.e., intruders are keeping themselves up to date 
with recent detection mechanisms to avoid detection. One 
efficient solution is the IDS detection mechanism. The IDS 
is currently one of the primary components used for 
protecting computers and networks against attacks. 
However, implementing an efficient IDS detection 
mechanism is not a straightforward task. IDS uses data 
sources to detect different types of attacks. Therefore, the 
IDS detection mechanism requires a proper data source to be 
able to analyze the inbound and outbound traffics and use 
them to detect any abnormalities. 
The typical IDS detection mechanism uses the raw 
network traffic as a data source to detect abnormalities 
within the network. Dealing with raw traffics requires in-
depth analysis and review to extract the information relevant 
for helping attack detection [1]. The SNMP-MIB parameters 
can also offer the required information, yet reducing the 
extensive processing time necessary for analyzing the raw 
traffics. The SNMP-MIB can be considered as a rich data 
collection fetched from a series of devices for producing 
realistic information about the health of a network, which 
can be also beneficial for detecting attacks. Moreover, the 
binary decision related to the attack events poses another 
challenge for implementing an efficient IDS detection 
mechanism because there is no clear decision line between 
normal and abnormal traffic patterns [2]. The fuzzy system 
provides an effective solution for dealing with the issues 
associated with establishing normal and abnormal decision 
boundaries. The fuzzy system can offer results in an explicit 
scheme and, consequentially, to determine the level of the 
attack. When as a binary decision, the degree of attack level 
generates an alarm, the provided attack level can help the 
administrator better understand the current network security 
status. 
On the other hand, applying classical fuzzy reasoning 
methods i.e. Mamdani [3] and Takagi-Sugeno [4], the fuzzy 
rule base representing the attack level needs to be complete. 
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Thus the rule base size grows exponentially with the number 
of the observed network parameters. In the case of partially 
defined incomplete fuzzy rule bases, the classical fuzzy 
reasoning methods could not offer the expected results for 
all the possible network parameter observations [5], [6]. 
In application areas such as IDS, it is challenging to 
generate complete fuzzy rule base capable of handling all 
possible expected observations. As a result, it is imperative 
to implement a fuzzy concept, especially for the IDS 
application area, that benefits from extending the binary 
decision to the continuous space and at the same time can 
efficiently handle the situation of the incompletely defined 
fuzzy rule base. At this moment, this paper proposes a novel 
IDS concept which implements the fuzzy rule interpolation 
as a detection mechanism based on the SNMP-MIB 
parameters. The strength of FRI methods comes from the 
combination of the fuzzy concept and the interpolation 
techniques. The FRI methods offer the required conclusion 
(the approximated level of attack) even when the fuzzy rules 
describing the attack situations are not completely defined. 
Consequently, the fuzzy rule base construction can be 
dramatically simplified. The FRI based IDS methods can 
achieve a satisfactory detection rate, even using only a 
relatively small number of fuzzy rules. In this paper, we 
break down the implementation of the proposed FRI IDS 
detection approach into three main steps: 
 
 
• To identify how the SNMP-MIB parameters can be 
used as a useful data source for detecting an 
abnormality. 
• To implement the proposed detection approach 
based on the strength of the fuzzy rule interpolation 
and the SNMP-MIB parameters. 
• To highlight and discuss the difference between the 
proposed detection approach and other approaches 
that detect intrusions based on SNMP-MIB 
parameters. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section (II) 
illustrates recent works related to the application of intrusion 
detection based on SNMP-MIB parameters. Section (II-A), 
investigates and analyzes the SNMP-MIB dataset, which is 
illustrated in detail. Then, Section (II-B), introduces the 
fuzzy rule interpolation. Section (II-C), introduces the 
proposed detection approach in detail, followed by the 
results and discussions in section (III). Lastly, section (IV) 
concludes the paper. 
II. MATERIAL AND METHOD 
This section presents some relevant works related to the 
application of the detection mechanism for intrusion 
detection. It also provides a brief overview of different 
methods and approaches that are used for intrusion detection 
using the SNMP-MIB parameters. Typically, the SNMP is 
used to collect information from different data sources such 
as switches, routers, etc. This information is used to manage 
and troubleshot different network devices. The typical IDS 
detection mechanism uses the raw traffic to assess the threats 
within connected devices. Raw traffic requires extensive 
investigative pre-processing to extract the required 
information. This investigative pre-processing is a time-
consuming task for the IDS detection mechanism [1]. 
Therefore, the SNMP-MIB parameters offer a solution that 
provides the required wealth of information without needing 
to investigate and pre-process a large amount of raw traffic 
extensively.  
The work of Cabrera et al. presented in [7] is one of the 
first attempts to apply the SNMP-MIB parameters as the 
data source for the IDS detection mechanism. The authors 
proposed a detection mechanism for Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDOS). Three types (Targa3, UDP Flood ad Ping 
Flood) of attacks were detected using the proposed detection 
mechanism. Altogether 90 SNMP-MIB parameters were 
used to detect the previous types of DDOS attacks. The 
SNMP-MIB parameters were collected from the simulated 
test-bed environment. The proposed detection mechanism 
was able to detect the predefined DDOS attacks 
successfully. 
In [1], Yu et al. propose a lightweight IDS detection 
mechanism by adapting the machine learning algorithm to 
the SNMP-MIB parameters. The proposed detection 
mechanism avoided the raw traffic analysis and used the 
statistical MIB parameters to recognize the degree of 
abnormality within connected devices. The authors applied 
the features selection algorithm to decrease a large number 
of SNMP-MIB parameters. The relevant parameters were 
determined using the correlation feature selection algorithm, 
and the network traffic was classified using the support 
vector machine. Furthermore, the SNMP-MIB parameters 
were extracted from real-time experiments. The proposed 
approach achieved a fast detection time and a high rate of 
accuracy. The work of Yu et al. in [8] focuses on using 
SNMP-MIB parameters to detect flooding attacks. The 
authors designed the flooding attack detection mechanism by 
adapting the C4.5 algorithm. The SNMP-MIB parameters 
were collected from the simulation environment operating 
the flooding attack. Then, the C4.5 algorithm starts detecting 
and classifying the traffics based on the recorded SNMP-
MIB parameters. The proposed approach was able to obtain 
a 93.0% detection rate. 
In [9], Hsiao et al. proposed a detection mechanism for an 
ARP spoofing attack. The SNMP-MIB parameters were 
used instead of the raw traffic. The proposed detection 
approach was contracted into three parts. The first part was 
adapted to the Naive Bayesian algorithm. The second part 
applied the support vector machine and last part applied the 
C4.5 algorithm. The authors recorded their findings and 
highlighted both the weak and strong points for each of these 
parts that were used for detecting the ARP spoofing attack 
based on SNMP-MIB parameters. Typical performance 
metrics such as accuracy rate, false positive rate, and 
missing rate were recorded for the implemented algorithms. 
The implemented experiments demonstrated that the C4.5 
achieved the highest accuracy rate. The support vector 
machine algorithm recorded the lowest value of false alarms. 
The Naive Bayesian algorithm had the lowest accuracy rate 
within the implemented experiments. 
From another perspective, the decentralized detection 
mechanism based on the clustering algorithm and SNMP-
MIB parameters was proposed by Cerroni et al. in [10]. The 
proposed decentralized mechanisms were divided into the 
monitoring phase and the traffic detection phase. In the 
monitoring phase, the SNMP-MIB parameters were gathered 
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from several agents. These parameters were forwarded to the 
distributed data mining algorithms for the sake of classifying 
the observation as either normal or abnormal. The proposed 
decentralized detection mechanism was tested and evaluated 
using the SNMP-MIB dataset and was able to detect the 
plausible intrusions within the dataset that related to the 
decentralized detection mechanisms. 
In [11], Cerroni et al. introduced a new distributed data 
mining method to detect the intrusion based on SNMP-MIB 
parameters. The proposed method has been tested for 
decentralized, test bed environments. The SNMP-MIB 
parameters were collected from the simulated network 
environment. Fourteen SNMP-MIB parameters were used to 
detect the specific type of DDOS attack — these parameters 
related to the IP and TCP groups. The experiments 
conducted reflect that the proposed mechanism obtained an 
acceptable detection rate. 
Some other works were used in a hybrid approach, in 
conjunction with the SNMP-MIB parameters, to detect for 
abnormalities within the network traffic. In [12], Namvarasl 
and Ahmadzadeh proposed a hybrid approach to detect 
DDOS based on SNMP-MIB parameters. The proposed 
approach consisted of three modules; the first module was 
constructed for the features selection of the SNMP-MIB 
parameters. In the second module, the detection mechanism 
was generated based on high ranked SNMP-MIB 
parameters, and the C4.5 and RIPPER were implemented to 
detect the intrusions. The proposed approach was tested and 
evaluated based on the SNMP-MIB dataset. The imported 
dataset consisted of 66 SNMP-MIB parameters. It also had 
the following type of attacks: UDP flood attack, ICMP flood 
attack, and TCP-SYN flood attack. The proposed approach 
was able to detect different types of attacks within the 
imported SNMP-MIB dataset. 
The previous works provided plausible contributions and, 
at the same time, supported the idea that the SNMP-MIB 
parameters are instrumental in detecting and recognizing the 
intrusion. Using SNMP-MIB parameters avoids the need for 
the time-consuming analysis of massive amounts of raw 
traffics. Previous works also shared common issues such as 
the difficulties associated with the detection mechanisms 
which suffered from a lack of clear boundaries for 
distinguishing between normal and abnormal traffic. 
Furthermore, the previous detection mechanisms did not 
determine the level of degree of abnormality; they only 
applied a binary decision to recognize normal and abnormal 
traffic. In response to these issues, this paper aims to 
introduce a novel approach for detecting and preventing 
abnormalities by implementing the FRI approach with the 
SNMP-MIB parameters. The FRI approaches are 
implemented primarily to avoid binary decisions, and 
instead, establishing a gradient scale for distinguishing the 
normal and abnormal traffics. 
Additionally, they generate results (Detection Decision) in 
a clear and understandable form. Contrary to the classical 
fuzzy systems, the FRI approaches do not require a large 
number of fuzzy rules (i.e., expert knowledge this case) for 
determining the level or degree of abnormality within the 
protected network. Finally, the FRI approaches can produce 
results, even in an incompletely defined knowledge 
representation (fuzzy rule base). 
A. SNMP-MIB Dataset 
A network attack [13] is any process used to perform 
malicious actions against any host inside a network to 
compromise the security of that network.  In [14]–[16], a 
Mobile Agent (MA) was used to read the SNMP-MIB data 
from the local nodes that use the MIBs to store that traffic 
data locally. The MA was used to overcome the limitations 
of the centralized management system or the IDSs. The 
works mentioned above reflected that the statistical methods, 
based on Wiener filter and MA technology, could be joined 
to detect network intrusions. The suggested model intended 
to detect all the attacks. The MIB variables were chosen 
from the IF and IP groups, and the studied scenarios were 
the decoy port-scan, the buffer overflow, the brute force 
attack, and the null session attack. 
In this paper, the dataset we used was the same as it was 
introduced in [17]. This dataset was originally generated to 
target DoS attacks. A DoS attack is blocking legitimate user 
requests for services the server can provide. Such attacks can 
be carried out by flooding the chosen server with a high 
volume of traffic, thereby consuming all of the server’s 
resources and, consequentially, preventing the server from 
responding to genuine requests. These attacks can be 
generated either from a local or remote node in a different 
network. DoS attacks are usually difficult to assess and 
prevent [18], making them one of the most challenging type 
threats. An even more severe threat is the DDoS attack, 
which is a type of flooding attack that is generated from 
various nodes simultaneously [19]. 
In this work, seven classic DoS flooding attacks are 
studied. The first one is the TCP-SYN attack. This attack 
abuses the susceptibility of the three-way handshake 
mechanism (SYN, SYN-ACK, and ACK) operating between 
the host and the server when establishing the TCP/IP 
protocol connection. During the process, the attacker sends 
an SYN control packet. The server, on the other side, 
responds to the SYN request by sending an SYN-ACK 
packet. Meanwhile, the server stores and reserves all the 
resources and waits for an ACK from the sender. While the 
server is waiting for the ACK packet, the request remains in 
the memory stack. The server will not receive ACK packets 
from the attacker, and the attacker will send more SYN 
requests within a short amount time to exhaust the server’s 
resources until it is unable to respond to any new requests 
[20]. 
The second attack is the UDP flood attack. This type of 
attack sends UDP packets to random ports on the victim 
server. When the server deals with these packets and 
discovers that the packets are empty, the server will then 
send back an error message through ICMP protocol to the 
sender. The server’s resources, such as bandwidth which is 
very important for the performance of the network will be 
exhausted by the volume of useless or empty packets, and 
therefore will not be able to respond to any other requests. 
The UDP flood attack is typically very effective in smaller 
networks [21]. 
The third attack is the ICMP-ECHO attack. This type of 
attack floods the victim’s bandwidth, thus preventing new 
connections from being initiated. The PING command is 
used to test whether, or not the host is alive on the network. 
When a device receives a PING request, it will automatically 
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reply with a message informing the sender of its status. This 
type of attack tricks the system by crafting a large number of 
ICMP packets using a spoofed source IP address as the 
victim’s IP address to reply directly to it later. Then it sends 
these packets through a network broadcast address which 
directs numerous hosts to send their replies to the same 
victim’s IP address at the same time. Eventually, the high 
volume of reply messages will overwhelm the system and 
exhaust the victim’s resources [17]. 
The fourth attack is the HTTP flood attack. This attack 
targets a web server and consumes the victim’s resources, 
such as memory, CPU, bandwidth, etc. The attacker sends a 
huge number of valid HTTP requests (GET or POST) to a 
web server. Typically, these requests are generated by hosts 
called botnets. Each one of the bots sends a large number of 
legal requests at once. If there is a large number of botnets, 
the request rate will be higher than that is usually generated 
by typical users. This attack may be one of the most 
dangerous threats because it is hard to differentiate between 
normal and abnormal HTTP traffic [22].  The fifth attack is 
the Slowloris attack, whereby the attacker sends sessions 
with a high load of requests by opening multiple connections 
to the victim server and trying to keep these connections 
open as long as possible. In this case, the requests are partial 
HTTP requests. The attack lasts until all available sockets 
are reserved by the HTTP requests, causing the server to 
freeze in response to any legitimate connection [24]. The 
final attack is the Slowpost attack. Similar to the previous 
attack, the attacker hereby sends a complete, rather than a 
partial, HTTP header request, including the content length 
field in the post message body. The data fills the message 
body at the rate of one byte every two minutes. At the same 
time, the server remains waiting for each message body to be 
completed, leading to a denial of services [17]. 
SNMP-MIB data are rich sources providing clear 
statistical information about the current network device 
status. The SNMP-MIB is a widely deployed protocol in 
most network devices, and available without any additional 
new hardware or software investment. By reading the MIB 
data, some of the major challenges of intrusion detection can 
be avoided. The dataset we used contains 4998 connection 
records. The data is distributed into eight main classes as 
described in Table I. 
 
TABLE I 
TRAFFIC TYPE AND NUMBER OF GENERATED RECORDS 
 
No. Type of Traffic Number of Records 
1 Normal 600 
2 TCP-SYN 960 
3 UDP flood 773 
4 ICMP-ECHO 632 
5 HTTP flood 573 
6 Slowloris 780 
7 Slowpost 480 
8 Brute Force 200 
TOTAL 4998 
 
This MIB dataset has been collected from a router. The 
dataset has 34 MIB variables from 5 MIB groups in MIB-II. 
The groups are IF, IP, TCP, UDP, and ICMP. The groups 
and their variables are listed in Table II. 
 
 
TABLE II 
THE SNMP MIB PARAMETERS 
Interface Group TCP group IP Group ICMP Group UDP Group 
IFInOctets TCPOutRsts IPInReceives ICMPInMsgs UDPInDatagrams 
IFOutOctets TCPInSegs IPInDelivers ICMPInDestUnreachs UDPOutDatagrams 
IFoutDiscards TCPOutSegs IPOutRequests ICMPOutMsgs UDPInErrors 
IFInUcastPkts TCPPassiveOpens IPOutDiscards ICMPOutDestUnreachs UDPNoPorts 
IFInNUcastPkts TCPRetransSegs IPInDiscards ICMPInEchos 
IFInDiscards TCPCurrEstab IPForwDatagrams ICMPOutEchoReps 
IFOutUcastPkts TCPEstabResets IPOutNoRoutes 
IFOutNUcastPkts TCPActiveOpens IPInAddrErrors 
 
B. Fuzzy Rule Interpolation (FRI) 
The term "fuzzy logic" was introduced initially by 
Professor Lotfi Zadeh [23]. Fuzzy logic could be a suitable 
reasoning method for different application areas. The rapid 
growth of intrusion techniques poses a challenge for binary-
decision based detection approaches. The crisp set [24] is 
not suitable for expressing the level of attack, which could 
improve the expression capabilities of the modern intrusion 
techniques. The fuzzy system also provides the required 
boundary smoothing because it can also deal with 
approximation, not only with precise values. The fuzzy 
system presents the conclusion (output) in a clear and 
comprehensive scheme. Establishing a fuzzy system requires 
several prerequisites: 
• Defining the universes of the expected observations 
(inputs) and the possible output of the fuzzy system. 
• Defining the fuzzy partitions for the inputs and 
outputs of the fuzzy system. 
• Generating the required fuzzy rules. 
Typically, IDS detection mechanism recognizes the 
intrusion based on crisp set that grants only membership of 
0, or 1. In the classical fuzzy system, the fuzzifier transforms 
the crisp input parameters (observations) into fuzzy sets. The 
output of the fuzzy system is calculated based on the 
fuzzified observations [2]. The classical reasoning methods, 
i.e. Mamdani and Takagi-Sugeno, demands a complete 
fuzzy rule base to generate the desired output. Therefore, the 
classical reasoning methods could not infer the conclusion 
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for any observation that is not defined in the fuzzy rule base 
[25]. 
Fig.1 shows an example of the complete fuzzy rule base 
in a classical fuzzy system. The parameter X is considered to 
be the input observation which is covered by the fuzzy rule 
base. Conversely, Fig.2 presents a case when an observation 
X is exists, but not covered by any rules of the fuzzy rule 
base. 
 
 
Fig.1  Complete Fuzzy Rule Base 
 
 
Fig.2 Incomplete Fuzzy Rule Base 
 
In the second case (Fig.2), the classical reasoning method 
could not offer any conclusion; it is a method that is not 
always capable of satisfying the needs of some application 
areas (requiring conclusion for all the possible observations). 
In some application areas, where there is a large number of 
unexpected observations and the expert knowledge base 
cannot cover all the observation domain, it could be difficult 
to present the complete fuzzy rule base [2]. Therefore, the 
FRI methods were introduced to overcome the demand of 
the complete fuzzy rule base. They generate the possible 
inference even in cases where there is no complete fuzzy 
rule base. Furthermore, the FRI methods reduce the number 
of fuzzy rules which could be beneficial for both decreasing 
the complexity of the fuzzy system, and the computation 
time of large systems. 
The proposed IDS approach is adapting the Fuzzy 
Interpolation based on the Vague Environment (FIVE) 
method as an inference engine. The FIVE methods were 
introduced by Kovacs in [26], [27] and [35]. The concept of 
the vague environment, introduced by Klawon in [28], refers 
to the indistinguishability of a fuzzy set and a crisp value. 
The concept of the vague environment can be expressed by a 
scaling function (s). The proper scaling function (s) which 
describes all the fuzzy sets of a fuzzy partition, should be 
implemented to produce a vague environment. According to 
[26]–[28], the scaling function (s) is suitable for describing 
the shapes of all fuzzy set of a fuzzy partition. In the vague 
environment, the level of similarity between two fuzzy sets 
illustrates the fuzzy membership function M(x). In the vague 
environment, two values are ε-distinguishable if their 
distance is greater than ε: 
                                     
                                     (1) 
Likewise, δs(X1, X2) represents the vague distance for the 
values X1 and X2.  
C. The Proposed Detection Approach 
This sub-section introduces the full architecture of the 
proposed detection approach in detail according to its main 
functions and prerequisites. The proposed detection 
approach adapts the FIVE FRI method as the inference 
engine. The FIVE method offers an approximated 
conclusion even in an incomplete fuzzy rule base.   
The general structure of the proposed detection approach, 
as it is shown in Fig.3, is initiated by the data-cleaning stage. 
This stage is responsible for assembling the required 
information using the SNMP agents. This information is 
then forwarded to the SNMP manager, which consists of a 
repository of MIB parameters. During the data cleaning 
stage, the MIB parameters were evaluated to determine their 
relevant parameters. The cleaning stage aims to reduce a 
large number of MIB parameters by eliminating those that 
are irrelevant. The detection stage of the proposed detection 
approach started with the Sparse Fuzzy Model Identification 
(SFMI), introduced by Johanyak in [29]. The outputs 
obtained from the data cleaning stage were passed through 
SFMI. It is worth mentioning that there are several 
operations achieved by the detection stage, including the 
sparse fuzzy rule generation, fuzzification, and the inference 
engine technique.  
The MIB parameters are characterized by the wealth of 
beneficial information they can offer for defining 
abnormality and reflect the normal and abnormal nature of 
the network traffics. The MIB dataset applied as an example 
in the rest of this paper is introduced by Al-Kasassbeh et al. 
in [17]. The data cleaning stage is essential for implementing 
the proposed detection approach. During the cleaning stage, 
the imported MIB dataset was divided into two parts. The 
first part was used for optimization, and detection approach 
generation, meanwhile the second part was used for the 
validation process. Sixty percent of the imported MIB 
dataset was randomly selected to train the proposed 
detection approach, and the rest of MIB dataset was used for 
the validation process. 
The imported MIB dataset consists of a large number of 
MIB parameters. To simplify the process, the top five 
relevant MIB parameters [30], [17] were chosen as input 
parameters for detecting the abnormality in the proposed 
detection approach. These MIB parameters are the IP-Out-
Discards and IP-In-Discards from the IP MIB group. IF-In-
Discards and IF-Out-Discards from the interface MIB group 
and ICMP-Out-Dest-Unreachs from the ICMP MIB group.  
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Fig.3 The General Structure of The Proposed Detection Approach 
 
 
The imported MIB dataset consists of a large number of 
MIB parameters. To simplify the process, the top five 
relevant MIB parameters [30], [17] were chosen as input 
parameters for detecting the abnormality in the proposed 
detection approach. These MIB parameters are the IP-Out-
Discards and IP-In-Discards from the IP MIB group. IF-In-
Discards and IF-Out-Discards from the interface MIB group 
and ICMP-Out-Dest-Unreachs from the ICMP MIB group.   
The training part is designed to generate two repositories. 
The first repository consists of only the intrusion traffics, 
and the second repository includes only the normal traffics.  
Algorithm 1 summarizes the data cleaning.   
 
Algorithm 1: Data Cleaning Stage 
Input: The MIB dataset 
Output: Two repositories of normal and abnormal  
1: while: the number of records not obtained do 
2: Re-sample the MIB- dataset into normal and abnormal 
3: Extract the top Five MIB parameters (ipOutDiscards, 
icmpOutDestUnreachs, ipInDiscardsfor, ifInDiscards and 
ifoutDiscards). 
 
4: Eliminate the rest of the MIB parameters. 
5: Forward the normal traffic beside the relevant parameters to 
the normal repository. 
6: Forward the abnormal traffic besides the relevant parameters to 
the abnormal repository 
7: end while 
 
 
Consequently, 2970 instances of normal and abnormal 
traffic were stored in two repositories. These instances had 
only the top five relevant MIB parameters. 
The detection stage consists of several operations 
including fuzzification, sparse fuzzy rule generation, and 
adapting the inference engine. The proposed detection 
approach was designed and constructed using the SFMI [29]. 
Before constructing the proposed detection approach, the 
top-five relevant MIB parameters were forwarded to the 
SFMI.  
As mentioned in section (II-B), the fuzzy rule generation 
and fuzzy sets optimization are the necessary modeling steps 
for constructing the proposed detection approach. In this 
work, the fuzzy rule generation and the fuzzy sets 
optimization were adapted using the Rule Base Extension 
based on the Default Set Shapes (RBE-DSS) method 
introduced by Johanyak et al. in [31] and [32]. Algorithm 2 
illustrates the sparse fuzzy rule generation process using the 
RBE-DSS method. 
 
Algorithm 2: Fuzzy Rule Generation Using RBE-DSS 
Input: The training part of MIB-parameters 
Output: The pool of sparse fuzzy rules    
1: while: The number of iterations not obtained do 
2: Initiates two fuzzy rules which covered the output universe. 
3: Starts modifying the initial parameters of the fuzzy set.  
4: The performance parameter; Root Mean Squared Error 
(RMSE) of the fuzzy system computed with the modified 
fuzzy set parameters. 
5: The fuzzy system should have the best value of RMSE for the 
next iteration. 
6: IF the RMSE parameter has the same value for           
several iterations or the performance of the fuzzy system 
interrupted Then 
7: The new fuzzy rule is generated to offer more chances of 
tuning. 
EndIF 
 
8:      The new fuzzy rule takes a position where the difference 
between the expected conclusion and the approximated 
conclusion is the maximum. 
9:   End While 
 
 
The output from Algorithm 2 is a pool of fuzzy rules 
forming a sparse fuzzy rule base. Therefore, these rules 
could not be implemented on classical reasoning methods, 
such as Mamdani and Takagi Sugeno, as they are demanding 
complete fuzzy rule base. The FRI methods effectively 
reduce the total number of fuzzy rules, having 245 fuzzy 
rules for the FIVE methods to detect the abnormality based 
on five MIB parameters. Table III presents a sample of the 
sparse fuzzy rule base that was generated by the RBE-DSS 
method.  
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TABLE III 
THE SPARSE FUZZY RULES BASED ON THE MIB PARAMETERS 
No. IFoutDiscards IFInDiscards IPOutDiscards IPInDiscards ICMPOutDestUnreachs Consequence 
1 Low Low Very Low Very Low Low Normal 
2 Low Low Very Low Very Low Medium Normal 
3 Low Low Very Low High High Normal 
4 Low Low Medium Medium Medium Normal 
5 Low Medium Very Low Very Low Low abnormal 
6 Medium High Very Low Very Low Low abnormal 
7 High Low Very Low Very Low Low abnormal 
8 High High Very High Very Low Low abnormal 
9 Medium Low Very High Very Low Low Normal 
10 Medium High Very Low High Medium abnormal 
11 Medium High Medium Medium High abnormal 
12 Medium Medium Very High Very Low Low Normal 
13 High Low Medium Medium Low abnormal 
14 Medium High Very Low Very Low Low abnormal 
15 Low High Very High Very Low High abnormal 
 
TABLE IV 
THE OPTIMIZED FUZZY SET PARAMETERS 
IpOutDiscards Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
[1 1 64.8 129.1] [472.55 536.85 601.15 665.45] [627.93 692.23 756.53 820.83] [758.75 823.05 887.35 951.65] [1287 1287 1287 1287] 
IpInDiscards Very Low Low Medium High 
[9 9 10.23 21.78] [19.33 21.78 24.23 26.68] [24.23 32.28 34.73 56.78] [34.73 56.78 58 58] 
icmpOutDestUnreachs Low Medium High 
[0 0 0.58 10.93] [0.58 10.93 12.08 22.43] 12.08 22.43 23 23 
ifinDiscards Low Medium High 
[0 0 8602.57 18434.06] [83567 93399 103230 113062] [178195 188027 196630 196630] 
ifoutDiscards Low Medium High 
[0 0 8602.57 18434.06] [83567 93399 103230 113062] [178195 188027.44 196630 196630] 
 
In the RBE-DSS method, the trapezoidal membership 
functions were chosen to apply during the fuzzy set 
parameters optimization. The ICMP-Out-Dest-Unreachs, IF-
Out-Discards and IF-In-Discards MIB parameters have three 
membership functions. These membership functions are 
classified into the following linguistic terms: Low, Medium, 
and Large. The ip-In-Discards MIB parameter has four 
membership functions classified into the following linguistic 
terms: Very Low, Low, Medium, and Large. Finally, the IP-
Out-Discards MIB parameter represents five membership 
functions which are classified into the following linguistic 
terms: Very Low, Low, Medium, Large, and Very Large. 
The inference engine of the proposed detection approach 
was performed by the FIVE methods. The FIVE FRI method 
and SFMI source codes can be downloaded through [32]. 
The RBE-DSS method optimizes the values of fuzzy set 
parameters to the maximum performance of the fuzzy IDS. 
Fig.4 presents the proposed detection approach’s antecedent 
partitions•. The proposed detection approach could offer the 
conclusion (detection result) even in situations where some 
MIB parameters are not explicitly defined in the generated 
fuzzy rule base. Table IV lists the fuzzy set values optimized 
by the RBE-DSS method. 
 
                                                 
•
 NOTE: VL = VERY LOW, L = LOW, M = MEDIUM, H = HIGH, VH= 
VERY HIGH. 
 
 
Fig. 4 The Antecedents Partitions of The Proposed Detection Approach 
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This section introduces the simulation and discusses the 
results of the proposed detection approach in details. The 
implemented experiments were performed using Matlab [33] 
and the Fuzzy Rule Interpolation Toolbox (FRIT) [32]. The 
FIVE methods was chosen as the inference engine of the 
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proposed detection approach. As detailed in section (II-C), 
the total number of training data consisted of 2998 instances 
of normal and abnormal traffics. The training data were used 
to construct and optimize the proposed detection approach. 
The rest of the MIB dataset consisted of 1998 instances 
which were used for the validation process. It is worth 
mentioning that, every observation within the SNMP-MIB 
dataset was presented as a fuzzy singleton. The proposed 
detection approach was able to generate intelligible results 
due to its fuzzy nature, subsequently allowing the degree of 
abnormality to be determined.  
Fig.5 presents the output response of the proposed 
detection approach in the case of the abnormal instance with 
the parameters which are listed in Table V. The data 
concludes that the degree of abnormality has been 
determined. Subsequently, the results, which are now more 
concise, serve to help administrators better understand the 
network’s current security status. 
TABLE V 
ABNORMAL MIB PARAMETERS EXAMPLE 
MIB Parameters Value 
IF-Out-Discards 7270 
IF-In-Discards 7270 
IP-Out-Discards 1287 
IP-In-Discards 9 
ICMP-Out-Dest-Unreachs 0 
 
 
 
Fig.5 the Output Response of the Proposed Detection Approach 
 
The proposed detection approach was evaluated in a two-
phase process. The first phase evaluated the normal 
repository and the second phase was evaluated the abnormal 
repository. A total of 1998 MIB parameter instances were 
tested and evaluated. Fig.6 displays the results from both 
phases (normal and abnormal) of the detection approach’s 
evaluation process. 
 
 
 
Fig.6 The Confusion Matrix of The Evaluation Process 
 
It was concluded that five instances of normal traffic were 
inferred incorrectly, and 115 instances of abnormal traffic 
were inferred incorrectly. The obtained results have been 
carefully analyzed and investigated to highlight the strengths 
of the proposed detection approach. Typically, the IDS 
detection mechanisms’ performance depends on a few 
performance metrics parameters (i.e. detection rate, true 
positive rate, etc.) [34], which help to generate some detailed 
results, which can be compared with other literature results. 
The performance metric formulas of [1] and [34] were 
used to assess the performance of the proposed fuzzy IDS 
detection approach. These formulas are the overall detection 
rate, the false negative rate, the false positive rate, the true 
positive rate (sensitivity), and the true negative rate 
(specificity). The overall detection rate (accuracy) indicates 
the accuracy rate for the proposed detection approach in 
normal and abnormal test environments. The false positive 
rate is an indicator of the total number of normal traffics that 
are recognized as abnormal (false alarm). The false negative 
rate is an indicator of the total number of abnormal traffics 
that are recognized incorrectly during the evaluation process 
(the total number of intrusions that successfully passed 
through the detection approach). Table VI presents the 
performance metrics for the proposed detection approach. 
TABLE VI 
THE PERFORMANCE METRICS FOR THE PROPOSED APPROACH 
Performance 
Parameter 
Value Formula 
Sensitivity 0.9346 TPR = TP / (TP + FN) 
Specificity 0.9792 SPC = TN / (FP + TN) 
Precision 0.9970 PPV = TP / (TP + FP) 
False Positive Rate 0.0208 FPR = FP / (FP + TN) 
False Negative Rate 0.0654 FNR = FN / (FN + TP) 
F-Meausre 0.9456 F=2*((P*recall)/(P+recall)) 
Accuracy 0.9399 ACC = (TP + TN) / (P + N) 
 
A. Difference From Typical Detection Methods 
To summarize the results mentioned above, the 
performance of the proposed detection approach achieved 
satisfactory values and, at the same time, supports the idea 
that implementing the fuzzy rule interpolation methods for 
the reasoning part together with the SNMP-MIB parameters 
could be a promising approach in the IDS application area. 
Moreover, the results obtained from the proposed detection 
approach were compared with other literature results [30] in 
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which the same MIB dataset and same number of relevant 
MIB parameters (top-5) were applied in combination with 
neural network, support vector machine and Bayesian 
network algorithms. Fig.7 compares the results between the 
proposed detection approach and other algorithms (neural 
network, support vector machine and Bayesian network). 
 
 
 
Fig.7 The detection rate comparison results 
 
Consequently, the implemented experiments 
demonstrated that the proposed detection approach achieved 
an acceptable accuracy rate. Moreover, it effectively reduced 
the false positive rate parameter.  
B. Distinction From The Typical Detection Approaches 
The conventional detection approaches focus on adapting 
the typical data mining algorithms, or the classical fuzzy 
reasoning methods, on being used with raw network traffics. 
Although FRI methods have been implemented in the IDS 
application area, these methods are still under investigation. 
Nevertheless, current research has yielded satisfactory 
results. The strength of FRI methods is derived from the 
combination of the fuzzy concept and interpolation 
techniques. Therefore, the FRI methods could pose an 
effective solution for the boundary problem and could also 
handle the deficiencies of the knowledge-based 
representation. The following key points can characterize the 
proposed detection approach: 
• The proposed FRI IDS detection approach, based on the 
(FIVE) FRI method, effectively smoothes the 
boundaries between normal and abnormal parameters 
by eliminating the binary decision. 
• The proposed FRI IDS detection approach provides the 
approximated degree of an abnormality even if the 
fuzzy rule base (knowledge representation) is not fully 
defined (sparse). 
• The proposed FRI IDS detection approach generates 
comprehensive results by providing the degree of 
abnormality. 
• The proposed FRI IDS detection approach effectively 
reduces the false positive rate and has obtained an 
acceptable detection rate value. 
• The data show that the proposed FRI IDS detection 
approach outperformed the support vector machine and 
neural network algorithms in case of the example MIB 
parameters dataset when it is compared to other 
literature results, having same conditions, in the same 
test-bed environment and with the same number of 
MIB parameters. 
• The strength of the proposed detection approach is 
based on combining the MIB parameters with the fuzzy 
rule interpolation reasoning method. Thus, there is no 
need to deal with raw traffics, which are time-
consuming and difficult to compute. Furthermore, this 
method eliminates the need for the complete fuzzy rule 
base. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper has introduced a novel method to detect 
abnormalities by combining the Fuzzy Interpolation based 
on the Vague Environment (FIVE) FRI reasoning with the 
Management Information Base (MIB) parameters. In that 
respect, there is no need to deal with raw traffic processing, 
which is time-consuming, and difficult to compute. This 
method also eliminates the need for creating a complete 
fuzzy rule base. The MIB parameters reflect the normal and 
abnormal nature of the network traffics. The proposed 
detection approach was designed and implemented using a 
sparse fuzzy model identification method. The Rule Base 
Extension using the Default Set Shapes (RBE-DSS) method 
was used to generate the sparse fuzzy rule base. The 
proposed detection approach was tested and evaluated using 
an open source MIB parameters dataset. The conducted 
experiments reflect that the proposed detection approach 
could effectively detect the abnormal traffics within the 
selected SNMP-MIB parameters dataset with 93.9% 
accuracy. 
The results of the proposed detection approach were 
compared with literature results, where the same MIB 
variables dataset was applied in precisely the same order. 
The results confirmed the benefits of implementing the 
fuzzy rule interpolation methods for the reasoning part of the 
detection mechanism together with the MIB parameters as 
traffics sources, and also demonstrated, that the proposed 
FRI IDS detection approach outperforms the support vector 
machine and neural network based detection on SNMP-MIB 
parameters dataset.  
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